We provide an axiomatic characterization of the measure of riskiness of gambles (risky assets) introduced by Foster and Hart (2009). The axioms are based on the concept of "wealth requirement."
Introduction
How are risks evaluated? Here risk is meant in the simplest sense: facing certain gains or losses, with given probabilities. The "subjective" approach considers each individual decision-maker separately, and proceeds according to that decision-maker's preference and utility. But can risks be evaluated in an "objective" manner-depending only on the risks themselves and not on the specific decision-maker's attitude? While at first sight this may appear a tall order, remember that objective measures do exist, as, for example, the return of the gamble (its expectation) and the spread of the gamble (its standard deviation). While the standard deviation is at times used also to measure riskiness, in general it is not a good measure of it. This is so, in particular, since the standard deviation is not monotonic: one may increase the gains and decrease the losses-which clearly lowers the risks-in such a way that the standard deviation actually increases.
New objective measures of riskiness have recently been developed by Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009) . While the approach of Aumann and Serrano is axiomatic (it is based mainly on their "duality" axiom), the approach of Foster and Hart is constructive, in providing for each gamble the critical wealth level that separates "bad" investments (such as those leading to bankruptcy) from "good" ones (such as those leading to increasing wealth).
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In the present paper we provide an axiomatic approach to the Foster-Hart measure of riskiness: we propose four basic axioms for a riskiness measure, and show that the minimal function satisfying these axioms is precisely the Foster-Hart measure.
Since "riskiness" does not appear to be a straightforward and obvious concept, one needs to have in mind a certain viewpoint and interpretation. The leading one that we propose is that of wealth requirement: the minimal wealth required to engage in a risky activity. Wealth requirements are common, for instance, in high-risk investments (such as hedge funds, in which one should not invest more than a certain proportion of one's wealth), in risky endeavors (such as getting a license for exploration of natural resourcese.g., oil and gas-or for building a large project-e.g., a new transportation system). After all, risks have to do with possible changes in wealth-whether gains or losses-and so it is natural to use the "wealth effects" in order to measure the riskiness.
The first two axioms that we propose are standard (and are satisfied by the return, the spread, and many other objective measures): distribution, which says that only the outcomes and their probabilities matter, and scal-ing, which says, for instance, that doubling the gamble doubles its riskiness (which is measured in the same units as the outcomes). The fact that we are dealing with riskiness and wealth requirements is expressed in the other two axioms: monotonicity, which says that decreasing some gains or increasing some losses must increase the wealth requirement, and compound gamble, which says that, once the wealth effect is taken into account, the way the gamble is presented does not matter.
Our result is that these axioms characterize the "critical wealth" for a certain class of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, i.e., that wealth level where the decision-maker is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the gamble.
2 Perhaps surprisingly, one of these functions turns out to be minimal for all gambles; that is, it bounds from below all wealth requirements, for all gambles (one may thus refer to it as the "critical critical wealth"). This minimal wealth requirement is precisely the Foster-Hart measure of riskiness. In other words, any wealth requirement (that satisfies the axioms) must be at least as conservative as the one given by the Foster-Hart measure.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the formal model and the four axioms. The main result that the Foster-Hart measure is the minimal function satisfying the axioms is stated in Section 3. Our axioms characterize a family of riskiness measures, which turn out to be the critical wealth levels for a certain one-parameter family of utility functions (specifically: crra-γ with γ ≥ 1); see Section 4. In Section 5 we show that dropping the wealth effect from the compound gamble axiom yields the Aumann-Serrano index (which may be viewed, in a certain sense, as the maximal riskiness function; see Section 7 (f)); this is a new axiomatic characterization of the Aumann-Serrano index. An outline of the proofs, together with some additional results, is provided in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7 with discussions and comments on further issues. The proofs and additional material are relegated to the appendices.
The Setup
Following Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009) , a gamble-or "risky asset"-is a real-valued random variable g that represents net changes to the wealth, such that losses are possible and the expected return is positive; i.e., 4 P[g < 0] > 0 and E[g] > 0. For simplicity we assume that each gamble g takes only finitely many values, say x 1 , x 2 , ..., x m , with respective probabilities p 1 , p 2 , ..., p m (where p i > 0 and m i=1 p i = 1); we will denote this as (x 1 , p 1 ; x 2 , p 2 ; ... ; x m , p m ), or (x i , p i ) i=1,...,m for short. We denote by G the collection of all such gambles. For each g in G, let L(g) := − min g ≡ − min 1≤i≤m x i > 0 be the maximal loss of g.
To each gamble g in G we want to associate a positive number Q(g) that measures its riskiness. As stated in the Introduction, an interpretation the reader may want to keep in mind is that Q(g) represents a certain kind of "cushion" or "reserve" needed for g: the wealth requirement of g. Let thus 5 Q : G → R + , where the positive number Q(g) > 0 is measured in the same units as the outcomes of g.
The Axioms
We propose four axioms that a riskiness or wealth requirement should satisfy. In Section 7 (b) we will provide some further comments on the rationale behind these postulates; let us already say here that a leading concern is that one wants to avoid manipulations that do not affect the gamble but do affect the wealth requirement. From now on g, h, ... always denote gambles in G.
4 P denotes "probability" and E denotes "expectation." Since, as we will see shortly, only the distribution of the random variables matter, there is no need to specify the underlying probability spaces. Alternatively, take a (large enough) probability space over which all the gambles are defined.
5 R = (−∞, ∞) and R + = (0, ∞) are the set of reals and the set of positive reals, respectively.
• distribution. If g and h have the same distribution then Q(g) = Q(h).
That is, only the outcomes and their probabilities matter. We will thus no longer distinguish between a gamble and its distribution, and will write g = (x 1 , p 1 ; ... ; x m , p m ).
• scaling. Q(λg) = λQ(g) for every λ > 0.
That is: Q(λx 1 , p 1 ; ... ; λx m , p m ) = λQ(x 1 , p 1 ; ... ; x m , p m ). Thus, the wealth requirement does not depend on the unit in which the outcomes are measured: rescaling all outcomes by a factor λ > 0 rescales it by the same λ.
• monotonicity. If 6 g ≥ h and g = h then Q(g) < Q(h).
Thus, if the outcomes of h are less than or equal to the outcomes of g (i.e., the gains in h can only be less than those in g, and the losses can only be greater)-with some inequalities being strict-then the wealth requirement for h must be strictly greater than the wealth requirement for g. In terms of distributions, one can write this as Q(x 1 + δ, p 1 ; x 2 , p 2 ; ... ; x m , p m ) < Q(x 1 , p 1 ; x 2 , p 2 ; ... ; x m , p m ) for any δ > 0 (iterating this condition yields, together with distribution, the same condition for any g h). Clearly, monotonicity together with distribution imply that the function Q is monotonically decreasing with respect to first-order stochastic domination (see Proposition 14 in Appendix A.3.1). While the axioms up to now are standard, the final one-the compound gamble axiom-is the main one that embodies the idea of "wealth requirement." We illustrate it with a simple example. Let g be a gamble with two possible outcomes, $200 and −$100 (i.e., a gain of $200 or a loss of $100), with probabilities p 1 and p 2 = 1 − p 1 , respectively, and assume that its wealth requirement is, say, Q(g) = $500. Consider two other gambles, h 1 and h 2 , that are independent of g, and let f be the compound gamble consisting of g followed by h 1 when g has resulted in a gain of $200, and by h 2 when g has resulted in a loss of $100 (see Figure 1 , top). Assume that the wealth requirement of h 1 is Q(h 1 ) = $700, which equals the original wealth requirement of g of $500 = Q(g) plus the gain of g of $200 realized before h 1 is taken; assume also that the wealth requirement of h 2 is Q(h 2 ) = $400, which equals the wealth requirement of g minus the $100 loss realized before h 2 is taken. Thus in each case the "new" wealth requirement-which equals the "old" wealth requirement Q(g) of g plus the outcome x of g-is precisely the correct wealth requirement for the continuation, h 1 or h 2 . What the compound gamble axiom says is that the original wealth requirement of g of $500 is appropriate also for the compound gamble f. This may be viewed as a kind of Sure-Thing Principle:
if no matter what the outcome of g will be-i.e., ex post-the resulting wealth requirement will be just right to continue, then the wealth requirement is the right one also overall-i.e., ex ante. In other words, one does not need to know what the outcome of g will be, since one will always have the correct wealth requirement to continue (with either h 1 or h 2 , respectively), no matter what the outcome of g will be.
The compound gamble axiom is slightly more general: it allows for no continuation gamble in some instances. For example, consider the compound gamble f ′ where the same h 1 is taken after the $200 gain as in f, but there is no further gamble after the $100 loss (see Figure 1 , bottom). Since, again, whenever a gamble is taken there is always the right wealth requirement, it follows that the wealth requirement for f ′ is also the same 7 $500 = Q(g).
In order to state the axiom formally, let 1 A denote the indicator of an event A (i.e., 1 A is a random variable that equals 1 if A occurred and 0 otherwise), and let [g = x] denote the event {ω : g(ω) = x} that the value of g is x; the compound gambles above can thus be written as f = g+1 [g=$200] 
. Finally, h is independent of A if the random variables h and 1 A are independent; that 7 In the extreme case where there are no continuation gambles at all, f = g and so of course Q(f ) = Q(g).
is,
for every value y of h. Since one can apply the axiom repeatedly, we state it in its simplest form:
• compound gamble. Let f = g + 1 A h be a compound gamble, where g, h ∈ G and A is an event such that g is constant on A, i.e., g| A ≡ x for some x, and h is independent of A.
] is the event that g takes the value
In the example of Figure 1 , bottom, the compound gamble axiom is applied once, and in Figure 1 , top, it is applied twice.
The Main Result
Let R be the measure of riskiness, introduced by Foster and Hart (2009) : for every gamble g ∈ G, the riskiness R(g) of g is given by
Our main result is:
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem) The minimal function that satisfies the four axioms distribution, scaling, monotonicity, and compound gamble is the measure of riskiness R; more precisely: (i) the function R 8 The event A is always assumed to have positive probability, i.e., P [A] > 0, and so the conditional probabilities are well defined.
9 To see that f is in G:
10 More precisely: the equation E [log(1 + (1/r)g)] = 0 (for r > L(g), since log x is only defined for x > 0) has a unique solution r ≡ R(g); see Foster and Hart (2009, Lemma 9) . When g = (x 1 , p 1 ; ... ; x m , p m ), (1) becomes m i=1 p i log (1 + x i /R(g)) = 0. We emphasize that while (1) (as well as (4) and (5) below) may appear at first sight as a sort of expected utility representation of R(g), this is not the case; (1) is an implicit equation defining it (we thank Moti Michaeli for this observation).
satisfies these four axioms; and (ii) if a function Q satisfies these four axioms then either Q(g) = R(g) for all g ∈ G, or Q(g) > R(g) for all g ∈ G.
The Main Theorem says that the minimal wealth requirement is precisely our riskiness measure R. As we will see in the next section, there are other possible wealth requirement functions Q that satisfy the axioms; however, each one yields strictly higher wealth requirement levels for all gambles.
We may now combine this result with that of Foster and Hart (2009) . A function Q that associates with each gamble a positive number may be used to decide at which wealth levels to accept or reject gambles. For instance, consider a decision-maker that accepts gambles whenever his wealth is no less than the wealth requirement given by Q; i.e., he accepts a gamble g at wealth w if and only if w ≥ Q(g); call him a Q-decision-maker. As in Foster and Hart (2009) , a decision-maker is guaranteed no-bankruptcy if, for any sequence of gambles, his acceptance and rejection decisions make his wealth never go to zero (with probability one). The result of Theorem 1 in Foster and Hart (2009) together with Theorem 1 above immediately yield:
Corollary 2 If Q satisfies the four axioms then a Q-decision-maker is guaranteed no bankruptcy.
The Other Riskiness Measures
What happens if we drop the minimality requirement? It turns out that our four axioms characterize a one-parameter family of functions (the minimal one being the Foster-Hart measure R). Rewriting the equation (1) that determines R(g) as
shows that R(g) is that wealth level where a decision-maker with utility function log(x) is indifferent between accepting and rejecting g (at all higher wealths he accepts g, at all lower wealths he rejects g); call this the critical wealth of the log utility for g. Now log(x) is precisely the utility function u(x) with constant relative risk aversion (crra) equal to 1; i.e., its Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk-aversion, rra u (x) := −xu ′′ (x)/u ′ (x), satisfies rra u (x) = 1 for all x > 0;
see Arrow (1965 Arrow ( , 1971 and Pratt (1964) . More generally, the crra-γ utility function-which satisfies rra u (x) = γ for all x > 0-is 11 u γ (x) = (1−γ)x 1−γ for γ = 1 and u 1 (x) = log(x) for γ = 1. The critical wealth of crra-γ for a gamble g, which we denote 12 R γ (g), is that wealth level where crra-γ is indifferent between accepting and rejecting g; it is thus given by the equation
As we will see below (Lemmata 5 and 8), for each γ ≥ 1 and gamble g in G the positive number R γ (g) is well defined by (3) and, moreover, R γ (g) is strictly increasing in γ (this is due to crra-γ becoming more risk-aversei.e., more "conservative"-as γ increases, and so the corresponding critical wealth is getting higher). We call the function R γ the γ-riskiness measure: for γ = 1 it is equivalently given by (1)-and so R 1 ≡ R, the Foster-Hart measure-and for γ > 1 by
Our result is that the four axioms precisely characterize the family R γ , the critical wealth levels of crra-γ, for γ ≥ 1:
Theorem 3 A function Q satisfies the four axioms of the Main Theorem if and only if there exists γ ≥ 1 such that Q(g) = R γ (g) for all g ∈ G.
Thus, our axioms imply that each wealth requirement function is determined by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility; this utility function has a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion of at least 1, and the wealth requirement is the minimal wealth level where the gamble is accepted by this utility.
11 Up to positive linear transformations, which do not affect what we do (see (3)); in the proofs in Appendix A it will be convenient to use a different version of u γ (see (7)).
12 R γ (g) is denoted w γ (g) in Aumann and Serrano (2008, Section IV.C) .
To illustrate the connection between equation (3) and the compound gamble axiom, recall the example of Figure 1 in Section 2.1. Using (3) for g and for h (in the first and third equalities below, respectively), we get (put
i.e., (3) for the compound gamble f ′ .
Wealth Independence and the Aumann-Serrano Index
To understand the role of "wealth," note that it only appears in the compound gamble axiom. There, the change in wealth due to the outcome x of the first gamble g affects the Q-requirement for the second gamble h, i.e., Q(h) = Q(g) + x; if, for instance, g resulted in a gain (i.e., x > 0), then one can afford an h with a higher Q-requirement. What happens if we make the measure Q "wealth independent" instead? That is, replace "Q(h) = Q(g) + x" with "Q(h) = Q(g), " which yields the following axiom:
• wealth-independent compound gamble. Let f = g + 1 A h be a compound gamble, where g, h ∈ G and A is an event such that g is constant on A, i.e., g| A ≡ x for some x, and h is independent of A.
Using this axiom instead of the compound gamble axiom characterizes the Aumann-Serrano index 13 R as :
Theorem 4 A function Q satisfies distribution, monotonicity, scaling, and wealth-independent compound gamble if and only if Q is proportional to the Aumann-Serrano index of riskiness R as (i.e., there exists a constant c > 0 such that Q(g) = cR as (g) for all g ∈ G).
The index of riskiness developed by Aumann-Serrano (2008) 14 is uniquely determined by the equation
How can one interpret the wealth-independent compound gamble axiom? One can show that it implies Q( T t=1 g t ) = Q(g 1 ) where the g t are independent and identically distributed gambles (see Proposition 22 in Appendix B for a general statement). This suggests 16 that such a Q may represent a certain "acceptable level of riskiness" that remains fixed over time, regardless of the gambles already taken, their realizations, and the resulting changes in wealth (see also Aumann and Serrano 2008, Section V.H). For instance, this level of riskiness could correspond to acceptance of g at all wealth levels (cf. Hart 2009)-again, a "wealth independence" requirement.
Returning to the class of γ-riskiness functions R γ (for γ ≥ 1) that are given by Theorem 3: the minimal one is R 1 ≡ R. What is the maximal one-the most conservative riskiness measure?
For every gamble g, the sequence R γ (g) increases with γ (since a higher γ corresponds to higher risk aversion, and thus to a higher critical wealth level); moreover, it can be shown that R γ (g) → ∞ as γ → ∞, and so the maximal riskiness is infinite. Nevertheless, the functions R γ have a well-defined limit behavior as γ → ∞, which turns out to be related to the Aumann-Serrano 14 This index was used in the technical report of Palacios-Huerta, Serrano, and Volij (2004) ; see the footnote on page 810 of Aumann and Serrano (2008) . It is the inverse of the "adjustment coefficient" of the insurance risk literature; see Meilijson (2009) . 15 We write exp(x) for e x . 16 Proposed by Robert Aumann (personal communication).
index; specifically, for every g ∈ G we have
(this can be easily shown by comparing (4) with (5); see also Aumann and Serrano 2008, Theorem C) . Equivalently,
for any Q as = cR as with c > 0. Thus any Q as that satisfies the axioms of Theorem 4 yields riskiness comparisons that are the same as those of the most conservative Q that satisfies the axioms of the Main Theorem; i.e.,
The Aumann-Serrano index may thus be viewed as the maximal riskiness in the family of measures R γ of Theorem 3-whereas the Foster-Hart measure is the minimal one (Theorem 1). See also Section 7 (f).
An Outline of the Proofs
This section is devoted to an outline of our proofs: we state a number of intermediate results that may be of interest on their own, and provide an informal tour of the proofs. The formal proofs are relegated to the appendices.
Proof Outline for Theorems 1 and 3
We start with Theorem 3, which says that Q satisfies the four axioms of Section 2.1 if and only if Q = R γ for some γ ≥ 1. This is the combination of the following three results:
Lemma 5 For each γ ≥ 1 the function R γ is well defined by (3).
Proposition 6 For each γ ≥ 1 the function R γ satisfies the four axioms.
Proposition 7 If Q satisfies the four axioms then there exists γ ≥ 1 such that Q = R γ .
While the proofs of Lemma 5 and Proposition 6 are essentially straightforward, the proof of Proposition 7 is not. We will describe the latter in Section 6.2.
The next lemma (whose proof is also easy) shows that the R γ functions are "well ordered":
Lemma 8 R γ (g) strictly increases with γ, i.e., R β (g) < R γ (g) for every g ∈ G and 1 ≤ β < γ.
So R 1 ≡ R is the minimal R γ for γ ≥ 1; hence, by Theorem 3, it is the minimal Q satisfying the four axioms-which proves our Main Theorem.
Proof Outline for Proposition 7
The main difficulty lies in the proof of Proposition 7, which we outline now. We first provide a number of consequences of our axioms.
The first one says that Q is always greater than the maximal loss.
Proposition 9 If Q satisfies the four axioms then Q(g) > L(g) for every g.
The proof here is somewhat tricky.
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Second, take a sequence of independent gambles g 1 , g 2 , ..., g t , ... with Q(g t ) = 1 for all t. Let x 1 , ..., x m be the distinct values of g 1 , and let f 2 be the compound gamble consisting of g 1 followed, after each outcome x j , by the (1 + x j )-multiple of g 2 ; thus,
Since Q((1 + x j )g 2 ) = (1 + x j )Q(g 2 ) = 1 + x j by scaling, applying compound gamble m times yields Q(f 2 ) = 1. In the same way, from f 2 and g 3 we get
with Q(f 3 ) = 1, and so on, leading to the following property:
.. is a sequence of independent gambles with Q(g t ) = 1 for all t and N is a positive integer, then Q(f N ) = 1.
Since the compound gamble axiom allows for no gamble after some outcomes, we can get a more general property. To state it formally, it is convenient to use the notion of a stopping time T, which is a random variable whose values are positive integers that specify how many gambles we take. The requirement is that T be adapted to the sequence (g t ) t , which means that for each integer n the event [T = n] that we stop immediately after g n is determined by the outcomes of g 1 , ..., g n only (i.e., by the past and not the future). We get the following:
.. is a sequence of independent gambles with Q(g t ) = 1 for all t and T is a bounded stopping time adapted to the sequence (g t ) t , then Q(f T ) = 1.
Proposition 10 If Q satisfies the four axioms then Q satisfies multiplicative compounding.
Third, recall that R γ (g) is that wealth level where crra-γ is indifferent between accepting and rejecting g; see equation (3). When γ ≥ 1 this critical wealth is well defined (see Lemma 5), since each gamble is rejected at low enough wealth and accepted at high enough wealth. This is however no longer true when 0 < γ < 1: for each such γ there are gambles in G that crra-γ accepts at all wealth levels (and so in this case equation (3) has no solution).
For example, the gamble g = (4, 1/2 ; −1, 1/2) is always accepted by the
all w ≥ 1. However, if a critical wealth does exist it is necessarily unique, and so we extend the definition of R γ (g) to all γ > 0: it is given by equation (3) whenever it has a solution (and thus for 0 < γ < 1 it is defined only for some 18 g).
From (3) it can be shown that R γ satisfies multiplicative compounding also for 0 < γ < 1 (for γ ≥ 1, recall Propositions 6 and 10). Moreover, as γ increases R γ (g) increases continuously from L(g) to ∞ (this generalizes Lemma 8), and we have:
(This is stated as Lemma 16 in Appendix A.3.4.) We emphasize that this γ need not satisfy γ ≥ 1.
We are now ready to present the basic argument that proves Proposition 7. Fix a function Q that satisfies the four axioms. Let g be a gamble with Q(g) = 1, and apply Lemma 11 (recall Proposition 9) to get γ > 0 such that R γ (g) = 1. Take a sequence (g t ) t of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) gambles, all with the same distribution as g; for every bounded stopping time T the gamble f ≡ f T = T t=1 (1 + g t ) − 1 satisfies Q(f ) = 1 and also R γ (f ) = 1 (see Proposition 10 and the paragraph just before Lemma 11 above). Now take z 1 very large and z 2 > −1 and very close to −1; then there is a stopping time T for which the resulting f has, with high probability, values that are close to either z 1 or z 2 (the sequence f n is a multiplicative random walk, and we put two absorbing barriers at z 1 and z 2 ). For simplicity ignore the various technical approximation issues 19 and assume that T is bounded and that f takes only these two values z 1 and z 2 .
18 All statements below regarding R γ for γ < 1 should thus be understood to hold whenever R γ is defined.
19 Continuity of Q could be of help here; however, we did not require it as an axiom (and it does not hold in full generality; cf. Foster and Hart 2009, Section V.B) . We use the monotonicity axiom instead, by bounding from above and from below as needed.
Next, take another g ′ gamble with Q(g ′ ) = 1, and apply Lemma 11 to get 
which implies by Lemma 11 that γ ′ = γ.
What we have thus shown is that there is a unique γ * such that Q(g) = 1
implies that R γ * (g) = 1; from this it follows (by scaling applied to both functions) that Q ≡ R γ * . But Q must be defined for all gambles g, whereas as we have seen this is not the case with R γ when 0 < γ < 1; therefore γ * ≥ 1, completing the proof of Proposition 7.
Proof Outline for Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4 is similar to the above proof (and in some ways simpler). One change is that, when we iterate wealth-independent compound gamble, we get:
Proposition 12 If Q satisfies distribution and wealth-independent compound gamble then Q satisfies additive compounding.
The proof of Proposition 12 is parallel to the proof of Proposition 10 (see Section 6.2 above). Using additive compounding together with the appropriate stopping times then shows that if Q(g) = 1 = cR as (g) and 20 In the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
showing that γ = γ ′ at the end of Section 6.2)-which proves Theorem 4.
Discussion
In this section we provide a number of additional comments.
(a) Non-manipulability interpretations of the axioms. The axioms may be viewed as certain conditions that make the wealth requirement immune to "manipulations."
Take the scaling axiom; if, for instance, there is a gamble g such that the wealth requirement Q(g/2) for g/2 is less than 1/2 the requirement for g, i.e., Q(g/2) < Q(g)/2, then one can lower the requirement for g by splitting it into two parts, 21 g 1 = g 2 = g/2, and then
on the other hand, Q(g/2) > Q(g)/2, then two institutions each holding g/2 can lower their wealth requirement from Q(g/2) to Q(g)/2 by presenting a "merged" exposure to g and splitting the wealth requirement. More generally, dividing g into λg and (1 − λ)g should not affect the wealth requirement, so we must have Q(g) = Q(λg) + Q((1 − λ)g) for every 0 < λ < 1, which yields the scaling axiom. Since λg and (1 − λ)g are fully correlated risks, scaling essentially says that the wealth requirement is additive over such fully correlated risks. Next, the compound gamble axiom may be viewed as saying that the wealth requirement should not be affected by the way the gamble is presented, whether as a two-step gamble (g followed by h) or a one-step gamble 22 f.
Finally, consider the monotonicity axiom; if it is not satisfied then one can keep the wealth requirement the same, or even lower it, while making the gamble worse by decreasing gains and/or increasing losses. Most existing riskiness measures-such as the standard deviation, or the Value-at-Risk (VaR)-suffer from this very significant drawback, which allows easy manipulations of the risks involved without affecting the required wealth or the needed reserves. 23 We emphasize that these manipulations are possible even when there is weak monotonicity (i.e., "Q(g) ≤ Q(h)" instead of "Q(g) < Q(h)"; see Appendix A.3.2 and Appendix C); note that VaR does satisfy weak monotonicity.
(b) The axioms are indispensable. In Appendix C we will show that the axioms are indispensable for our result: dropping any one of them while keeping the others allows for additional functions Q. In particular, Proposition 23 there shows what happens when one replaces monotonicity with weak monotonicity. Moreover, in Appendix D we prove that if we replace scaling by a certain continuity axiom, then the axioms characterize the critical wealth level for a class of utility functions that is larger than crra.
(c) Relative returns. In view of the scaling axiom, one may restate everything in terms of relative rather than absolute returns. Indeed, the net absolute returns described by a gamble g at wealth level w yield net relative returns of g/w (and gross relative returns of 1 + g/w). Then, instead of dealing with the "right" wealth for the gamble g, one deals with the "right" proportion of g per unit of wealth. The two approaches are thus equivalent.
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(d) Maximal growth rate (the "Kelly criterion"). While our axioms lead to the log utility, we emphasize that a decision-maker with log utility does not behave according to R. A log-utility maximizer takes the gamble g when his wealth equals K ≡ K(g) which maximizes E [log(1 + g/K)] (and not when his wealth is R(g), where he is indifferent between accepting and rejecting g). Following Kelly (1956) and the subsequent extensive literature (see Foster and Hart 2009 , Section IV.E, point 5), the rule induced by this function K(g) (called the "Kelly function") maximizes the growth rate of one's wealth. Now the first-order condition that determines
(multiply by K and subtract from 1). Comparing with (4) shows that this equation is precisely the equation for R 2 (i.e., when γ = 2), and so K(g) = R 2 (g) for all g; i.e., K is the critical wealth for the crra-2 utility u 2 (x) = −1/x. The Kelly function is thus one of our riskiness functionsalbeit not the minimal one R; in particular, it satisfies the four axioms and all their consequences (see (e) below).
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(e) Additional properties. It is straightforward to check that all the properties of R in Section V of Foster and Hart (2009)-such as subadditivity, convexity, dilution, independent gambles, and continuity-are satisfied also by all the R γ with γ ≥ 1; indeed, all the proofs there work mutatis mutandis with u γ instead of u 1 ≡ log . Theorem 3 therefore implies that all these properties follow from our four axioms distribution, monotonicity, scaling, and compound gamble.
(f ) The Aumann-Serrano index as the maximal riskiness. As we have seen in Section 5, the Aumann-Serrano index may be viewed as the "asymptotic maximal riskiness." In terms of axioms, consider the functions R γ := R γ /γ; these rescaled versions of the R γ functions satisfy distribution, scaling, and monotonicity, and an appropriately rescaled version of compound gamble:
• δ-compound gamble. Let f = g +1 A h be a compound gamble, where g, h ∈ G and A is an event such that g is constant on A, i.e., g| A ≡ x for some x, and h is independent of A.
(the change is in the condition "Q(h) = Q(g) + δx"). Clearly,R γ satisfies this axiom for δ = 1/γ. As δ decreases to 0, so does the wealth effect (i.e., the outcome x of g multiplied by δ), leading in the limit to the wealth-independent compound gamble axiom (which is nothing but the 0-compound gamble axiom). This is the axiomatic counterpart of (6):R γ = R γ /γ converges to the Aumann-Serrano index R as , which is indeed independent of wealth.
(g) Bounded gambles. As in Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009), we have assumed that our gambles have finite support. We can easily accommodate general distributions, provided they are bounded. Let B be the collection of all bounded gambles: a random variable g ∈ B if E [g] > 0, P [g < 0] > 0, and there is a constant B such that |g| ≤ B. Our results continue to hold on the larger domain B. An easy way to see this is to take, for every g in B, gambles g 1 and g 2 in G such that g 1 ≤ g ≤ g 2 and g 2 − g 1 and L(g 1 ) − L(g 2 ) are arbitrarily small (use monotonicity).
(h) crra(γ) for γ < 1. Consider the crra(γ) utility function u(x) = x 1−γ for 0 ≤ γ < 1; can one define its critical wealth R γ (g)? Not for all gambles, since for each such u γ there are gambles g for which equation (3) has no solution. The reason is that these gambles are always accepted by these utilities (which are not sufficiently risk-averse; cf. Hart 2011) . See the discussion following Proposition 10 in Section 6.2 and Lemma 20 in the Appendix.
A Proof of Theorems 1 and 3
We prove here our main result; for an outline of the proof, see Sections 6.1 and 6.2. The proof is divided into three parts. In Section A.1 we show that the functions R γ for γ ≥ 1 are well defined (Lemma 5) and strictly increasing in γ (Lemma 8); in Section A.2, that these functions satisfy the four axioms (Proposition 6); and in Section A.3, that these are the only functions to satisfy the four axioms (Proposition 7). Several consequences of the axioms are provided in Section A.3.
Since applying increasing linear transformations to the u γ functions does not affect (3) and (4), in the proofs we will use for convenience (see Lemma 13 below) the following version of u γ :
For every γ ≥ 0 the utility function u γ : R + → R has constant relative risk aversion (crra) equal to γ, i.e., −xu
A.1 The Functions R γ
We collect in the next lemma several useful properties of the functions u γ ; we omit the proofs as they are immediate.
Lemma 13 (i) For each γ ≥ 0 the function u γ is strictly increasing, u γ (1) = 0, and u
for every x = 1, and there exists a strictly increasing and strictly concave function ψ ≡ ψ β,γ with ψ(0) = 0 such that u γ (x) = ψ(u β (x)) for every x > 0.
(iv) u γ (x) is continuous in γ for every x > 0.
With u γ given by (7), the equation (3) defining R γ (g) can be rewritten as
(cf. (1) and (4)). We now prove Lemma 5 (that R γ (g) is well defined) and Lemma 8 (that R γ (g) increases in γ) together.
Proof of Lemmata 5 and 8. Fix the gamble
; the function φ γ (λ) := E [u γ (1 + λg)] satisfies the following (see Lemma 13 (i) and (ii)): it is strictly concave;
Moreover, β < γ implies by Lemma 13 (iii) that
(the strict inequality follows from the strict concavity of ψ); now φ γ (λ) ≥ 0 for every λ ∈ [0,λ γ ] (since φ γ is concave and φ γ (0) = φ γ (λ γ ) = 0); henceλ β cannot lie in this interval, and soλ β >λ γ , proving Lemma 8.
A.2 The functions R γ for γ ≥ 1 satisfy the axioms
In this section we prove Proposition 6 (that R γ satisfies the four axioms). To prove that compound gamble holds, take g, h, A, x to be as in the statement of the axiom; put r := R γ (g), then R γ (h) = r + x. Conditioning on the event A, where g = x and f = x + h, we get
(the second equality follows from the independence of h and A, and the third from (3) since R γ (h) = r + x). On the complementary event A C , where
Combining (9) and (10) and then using (3) for g yields
But this says, again by (3) (and Lemma 5), that R γ (f ) = r = R γ (g).
A.3 Only the functions R γ for γ ≥ 1 satisfy the axioms
We start with three consequences of the axioms, concerning first-order stochastic dominance, the relation to the maximal loss, and multiplicative compounding (see Propositions 14, 9, and 5, respectively). Throughout this section Q is a fixed wealth-requirement function that satisfies the four axioms of Section 2.1.
A.3.1 First-order stochastic dominance
Let g, h ∈ G. The gamble g first-order stochastically dominates the gamble h, which we write as g SD 1 h, if P [g ≥ c] ≥ P [h ≥ c] for every real constant c, with strict inequality for some c; informally, g gets higher values than h. As is well known, g SD 1 h if and only if there exist g ′ , h ′ defined on the same probability space such that g and g ′ have the same distribution, h and h ′ have the same distribution, g ′ ≥ h ′ , and g ′ = h ′ .
Proposition 14 If g SD 1 h then Q(g) < Q(h).
Proof. Taking g ′ and h ′ as above, we have
by distribution, monotonicity, and again distribution.
A.3.2 Maximal loss and wealth requirement
Here we prove Proposition 9: the wealth requirement must always be strictly greater than any possible loss. We first prove a weak inequality.
Lemma 15 Q(g) ≥ L(g) for every g.
Proof. By way of contradiction, let h = (x 1 , p 1 ; ... ; x m , p m ) satisfy Q(h) < L(h); without loss of generality (use scaling), assume that Q(h) = 1 < L(h). For every n ≥ 2 let g n := (n, 1/2 ; −1, 1/2) ∈ G, and put q n := Q(g n ) > 0; by monotonicity we have q n ≤ q 2 . Let f n be the following compound gamble:
since Q((q n + n)h) = q n + n = Q(g n ) + n (by scaling), it follows that Q(f n ) = Q(g n ) = q n (by compound gamble). Let h ′ be the following gamble:
(it is the so-called "1/2-dilution" of h + 1); note that h ′ has negative values since L(h) > 1, and is thus a gamble in G. Comparing with f n shows that (q n + n)h ′ first-order stochastically dominates f n , since (q n + n)(x i + 1) > n + (q n + n)x i for every i = 1, ..., m, and 0 > −1. Therefore Q((q n + n)h ′ ) ≤ Q(f n ) = q n by monotonicity (more precisely, Proposition 14), and so
by scaling. This holds for each n ≥ 2, and the limit as n → ∞ yields Q(h ′ ) = 0 (recall that the q n -s are bounded: 0 < q n ≤ q 2 ), contradicting the fact that Q(h ′ ) must be positive.
Remark. Only a weak form of monotonicity-and, henceforth, of stochastic dominance-was used in the proof of Lemma 15 above, namely:
See Section C for further discussion and results.
Proof of Proposition 9. By Lemma 15 we have Q(g) ≥ L(g). If there is a gamble h ∈ G with Q(h) = L(h), then increasing one of the positive values of h yields another gamble h ′ ∈ G with Q(h ′ ) < Q(h) (by monotonicity).
(the first equality is by assumption, the second by construction), and so
, contradicting Lemma 15 for h ′ .
A.3.3 Multiplicative compounding
Given a sequence of random variables (g t ) t=1,2,... , a stopping time (adapted to the sequence (g t ) t ) is a random variable T with values in N∪{∞}, where N is the set of positive integers {1, 2, ...}, such that for each finite n ∈ N the event [T = n] is determined by {g 1 , g 2 , ..., g n } only; that is, whether one stops after n is determined by the past-the realizations of the first n random variables in the sequence-and not the future. T is bounded if T ≤ N for some finite N < ∞, and T is almost surely (a.s.) finite if P [T < ∞] = 1. For every finite n ∈ N put f n := n t=1 (1 + g t ) − 1; the random variable f T is then given by (f T )(ω) := f T (ω) (ω) for each ω ∈ Ω, where Ω denotes the probability space over which the g t -and thus also T -are all defined.
We now prove Proposition 10 (that multiplicative compounding follows from our axioms).
Proof of Proposition 10. Since T is bounded, there is an integer N such that T ≤ N ; we will use induction on N. For N = 1 we have T ≡ 1 and thus f T = g 1 . Assume that the result holds for all stopping times T ′ ≤ N − 1, and take T such that T ≤ N. Let x 1 , x 2 , ..., x k be those values of g 1 where T > 1 (recall that the event [T = 1], and thus its complement [T > 1], depend only on g 1 ); assume that x 1 , x 2 , ..., x k are distinct.
For each j = 1, ..., k, let T j denote the stopping time T when g 1 = x j ; i.e., T j is determined by the sequence g 2 , g 3 , ... and takes the value that T takes on the sequence g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , ... with g 1 = x j (formally, T j (g 2 , g 3 , ...) := T (x j , g 2 , g 3 , ...); thus 2 ≤ T j ≤ N. Put h j := T j t=2 (1 + g t ) − 1; since the product has T j − 1 ≤ N − 1 terms, the induction hypothesis implies that Q(h j ) = 1. We have
Let f (0) := g 1 , and, for each j = 1, ..., k, put
here we use the fact that x j and x 1 , ..., x j−1 are distinct); (1 + x j )h j is independent of A j (the former depends on g t for t ≥ 2 and the latter on g 1 ); and Q((1 + x j )h j ) = (1 + x j )Q(h j ) = 1 + x j (by scaling). Therefore, by compound gamble,
Remarks. (i) monotonicity was not used in the proof of Proposition 10.
(ii) compound gamble is a special case (with T ≤ 2) of multiplicative compounding.
(iii) When Q(g t ) = q for every t, multiplicative compounding yields
q and use scaling).
28 This is a little more subtle than it may seem at first sight, since, for instance, in the second application of compound gamble h 2 is not independent of f (1) := g 1 +1 [g1=x1] (1+ x 1 )h 1 (since h 1 and h 2 are not necessarily independent). However, h 2 is independent of the event [f (1) = x 2 ], which is the same as [g 1 = x 2 ], since x 1 and x 2 are distinct values of g 1 .
29 Note that, in particular, f T ∈ G.
(iv) A more general version of multiplicative compounding is the following:
where (g t ) t=1,2,... is a sequence of independent gambles, q > 0, and T is a bounded stopping time adapted to the sequence (g t ) t , then Q(f ) = q.
Interestingly, when Q satisfies distribution, the above requirement is equivalent to scaling and compound gamble together (indeed: T = 1 gives scaling, and T ≤ 2 gives compound gamble).
A.3.4 Proof of Proposition 7
We are now ready for the main proof here, namely, Proposition 7: if Q satisfies the four axioms then Q coincides with one of the R γ functions for some γ ≥ 1. We start by associating with every gamble g such that Q(g) = 1 (and thus, by Proposition 9, L(g) < 1) aγ such that (essentially) Rγ(g) = 1; this is stated as Lemma 11 in Section 6.2.
Lemma 16 For every g with L(g) < 1 there exists a uniqueγ ≡γ(g) > 0 such that E[uγ(1 + g)] = 0.
Proof. The function γ → E[u γ (1 + g)] is strictly decreasing and continuous (by Lemma 13 (iii) and (iv); recall that g has finitely many values). Moreover,
Whenγ ≥ 1, this indeed says that Rγ(g) = 1; however, at this point it is conceivable that we haveγ < 1 for some gambles. Next, we show thatγ is not affected by multiplicative compounding (compare Proposition 10).
Lemma 17 Let (g t ) t=1,2,... be a sequence of independent gambles with L(g t ) < 1 andγ(g t ) = γ for all t. Let T be a stopping time, and f T := T t=1 (1+g t )−1.
If either (i) T is bounded, or (ii) T is a.s. finite and f n for n ≤ T are uniformly bounded, then
Proof. When γ = 1, for every integer n we have E[(1 + g n ) 1−γ ] = 1 (sincẽ γ(g n ) = γ), which implies that the sequence X n :
1−γ is a martingale:
(the g t are independent). Therefore E [X n ] = E [X 0 ] = 1 for every n, and so, given the assumptions on the stopping time T, it follows that E[
When γ = 1 the sequence X n := log(1 + f n ) = n t=1 log(1 + g t ) is a martingale (since E [X n ] = 0), and in the same manner we get
Note that for γ ≥ 1 this result follows from Proposition 10 applied to R γ (recall Proposition 6); however, here we also prove it for 0 < γ < 1.
For every β > 0 and z > 1 let h β,z be the two-valued gamble that takes the positive value z − 1 and the negative value 1/z − 1 with appropriate probabilities so that R β (h β,z ) = 1; specifically,
Clearlyγ(h β,z ) = β (when β = 1 we have E (1 + h β,z ) 1−β = 1, and when β = 1 we have E [log(1 + h 1,z )] = 0 since then p = 1/2 by (11)); and h ≡ h β,z is a gamble in G (since 1/z − 1 < 0 and
Lemma 18 Let g ∈ G satisfy Q(g) = 1 and R γ (g) = 1.
(i) For each β > γ there exists z 0 large enough such that Q(h β,z ) < 1 for all z > z 0 .
(ii) For each β < γ there exists z 0 large enough such that Q(h β,z ) > 1 for all z > z 0 .
Proof. Assume that 0 < γ * < 1. Let z > 1/(1−γ * ), and consider the gamble g = (2 z − 1, 1/2 ; − 1, 1/2) ∈ G. Let q := Q(g); then q ≥ L(g) = 1 by Lemma 15 and Q((1/q)g) = 1 by scaling, and so E[u γ * (1 + (1/q)g)] = 0 by Lemma 19. Put φ(λ) := E [u γ * (1 + λg)] ; then φ is a concave function with φ(0) = 0 and
therefore φ(λ) > 0 for every 0 < λ ≤ 1, contradicting φ(1/q) = 0 (recall that q ≥ 1).
Proof. Let q := Q(g) and h := (1/q)g; then Q(h) = 1 (by scaling), and so E[u γ * (1 + (1/q)g)] = 0 (by Lemma 19), which says that R γ * (g) = q (by Lemma 20).
Proof of Proposition 7. Follows from Corollary 21 and Lemma 20.
A.4 Conclusion
Proof of Theorem 3. Follows from Lemma 5 and Propositions 6 and 7.
Proof of Theorem 1. Follows from Theorem 3 and Lemma 8.
B Proof of Theorem 4
In this Appendix we prove Theorem 4 that characterizes the Aumann-Serrano index. We start with the counterpart of Proposition 10 using wealthindependent compound gamble instead of compound gamble:
Proposition 22 Let Q satisfy the wealth-independent compound gamble axiom, and let (g t ) t=1,2,... be a sequence of independent gambles with Q(g t ) = 1 for all t. Let T be a bounded stopping time, and put
Then f T ∈ G and Q(f T ) = 1.
It is noteworthy how the two "compound gamble" axioms lead to multiplicative compounding and additive compounding, respectively. The proof of Proposition 22 is similar to that of Proposition 10 and is omitted.
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Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is similar to the proofs in Section A, and in some places simpler; we will thus be brief here.
First, note that Q satisfies the axioms if and only if cQ satisfies the axioms, for any c > 0. To see that R as satisfies the wealth-independent compound gamble axiom (the other axioms are immediate), take g, h, A, and f as in the statement of the axiom. Put λ := 1/R as (g) = 1/R as (h); then E [exp(−λg)] = E [exp(−λh)] = 1. On A we have f = x + h, and so
On A C we have f = g, and so
and so R as (f ) = 1/λ = R as (g).
Conversely, let Q satisfy the four axioms. Take g ∈ G with Q(g) = 1, and put c := 1/R as (g) > 0. Given a sequence g t of independent gambles, all with the same distribution as g, let f n := n t=1 g t ; then exp(−cf n ) is a martingale (since E [exp(−cg t )] = E [exp(−cg)] = 1), and so E [exp(−cf n )] = 1 for every n ≥ 1.
Next, for b > 0 and z > 1, let h b,z ∈ G take the values log z and − log z with probabilities 1 − p and p, respectively, where p = 1/(z b + 1); then 
, and also E [exp(−cf T )] = 1 (since exp(−cf n ) is a martingale and f T is bounded). This implies that q : This shows that there exists a constant c * > 0 such that Q(g) = 1 implies that R as (g) = 1/c * , or Q(g) = c * R as (g) for any g with Q(g) = 1; scaling applied to Q and R as implies that Q(g) = c * R as (g) for any g ∈ G.
Remarks.
(1) Since α := 1/R as (g), the "adjustment coefficient" of g, satisfies E [exp(−αg)] = 1, additive compounding (and its special case, the wealth-independent compound gamble axiom) immediately follow (for instance, exp(−α N t=1 g t ) is a martingale when the g t are i.i.d. and distributed like g). Interestingly, Theorem 4 shows that, in the presence of the other axioms, this is the only way to get additive compounding.
(2) scaling is only used in the last line of the proof. Without scaling we get the conclusion that Q is ordinally equivalent to R as , i.e., Q is a monotonic transformation of R as (indeed: we have shown that there exists a constant c * > 0 such that Q(g) = 1 implies that R as (g) = 1/c * ; in the same way one
shows that for every q > 0 there exists c * (q) > 0 such that Q(g) = q implies that R as (g) = 1/c * (q)).
C The axioms are indispensable
We will show here that the axioms of Section 2.1-monotonicity, scaling, and compound gamble-are indispensable: for each one we provide a function Q with Q(g) < R(g) for some g (or even all g) in G that satisfies all the other axioms. We conclude with a discussion of the distribution axiom.
The monotonicity axiom
The function L that associates to each gamble g its maximal loss L(g) clearly satisfies distribution and scaling. To see that L also satisfies compound gamble, take g, h, A, f as in the statement of the axiom; thus
But L does not satisfy monotonicity: just increase any of the outcomes of g that are above L(g), and then L does not decrease. Of course, L(g) < R(g) for all g ∈ G.
Clearly, L satisfies the weak monotonicity axiom, with "Q(g) ≤ Q(h)" instead of "Q(g) < Q(h)"); see the Remark following the proof of Lemma 15. Interestingly, replacing monotonicity with this weaker axiom yields the following result (compare our main result Theorem 1):
Proposition 23 The minimal function that satisfies the four axioms distribution, scaling, weak monotonicity, and compound gamble is the maximal loss function L.
Proof. We have just seen that L satisfies these axioms; Lemma 15 (see the Remark following its proof) shows that Q ≥ L for any Q satisfying these four axioms, so L is indeed the minimal function.
The scaling axiom
Take the utility function u(x) = x + log(x) for all x > 0 (note that it is not a crra utility), and define Q(g) := r as the unique solution r > L(g) of the equation E [u(r + g)] = u(r).
We claim that Q is well defined: for every x > 0 we have
Absolute Risk Aversion (dara) utility function. An agent with such a utility is monotonic in his decisions: for each g there is a unique critical wealth level w 0 ≡ w 0 (g) with 0 ≤ w 0 ≤ ∞ such that at all wealth levels w < w 0 the agent rejects g (i.e., E [u(w + g)] < u(w)), and at all wealth levels w > w 0 it accepts g (i.e., E [u(w + g)] > u(w)); see Pratt 1964 , Yaari 1969 , Dybvig and Lippman 1983 , Hart 2011 . Put φ(r) := E [u(r + g)] − u(r) (for our specific u); then lim r→L(g) + φ(r) = −∞ (since lim x→0 + u(x) = −∞), and
. Therefore the equation φ(r) = 0 has a solution r in the interval (L(g), R(g)), which is unique since that is precisely the critical w 0 . Moreover, Q satisfies distribution, monotonicity (if g ≥ h and
since u is strictly increasing; recalling the function φ of the previous paragraph, Q(h) thus lies in the region where φ is positive, and so it is larger than the root Q(g) of φ), and compound gamble (the proof of Proposition 6 did not use any special property of the u γ function beyond the existence and uniqueness of the solution of (3), and so it applies to our u too). However, Q does not satisfy scaling, since u is not homogeneous of degree one; e.g., for g = (2, 1/2 ; − 1, 1/2) we get Q(g) ≈ 1.155 and Q(2g) ≈ 2.098 = 2Q(g).
As we have seen above, this function Q satisfies Q(g) < R(g) for every g. This example suggests that without scaling the other axioms may characterize the critical wealth functions for a wider class of utilities than crra.
In Appendix D we show that is indeed the case, once we add a continuity axiom (which is needed to provide a certain degree of regularity; in the results of our Theorems 1 and 3, regularity is implicitely provided by scaling).
The compound gamble axiom Take Q(g) = δR(g) < R(g) for some fixed 0 < δ < 1: it satisfies all the axioms (as well as the δ-compound gamble axiom; see Section 7 (f)) but not the compound gamble axiom.
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The distribution axiom
The distribution axiom is needed since it is more convenient to work with random variables than with probability distribution. Without it, one can easily get a counterexample to the result of Theorem 3: fix a probability space Ω 0 , and put Q(g) = R 2 (g) for all g defined on Ω 0 and Q(g) = R 1 (g) otherwise. However, we conjecture that one cannot go beyond this: a function Q that satisfies the other three axioms must equal on each probability space one of the R γ functions (and thus the result of the Main Theorem may well hold without the distribution axiom).
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D Without scaling
In the previous appendix we saw a critical wealth function that does not satisfy scaling: it is obtained from a non-crra utility. This suggests 35 that one may characterize the class of functions Q that satisfy all axioms except scaling. We will show here that the other axioms, together with a 33 Another example that satisfies the first three axioms but not compound gamble is R AS (see Theorem 4); while R AS differs from all the R γ of Theorem 3, it is not always less than R.
34 The proof, based on arguments of the kind used in Section A.3, may be quite complex. 35 We thank the referees for this suggestion.
certain continuity axiom, 36 characterize the critical wealth functions for a class of dara (decreasing absolute risk aversion) utilities. Moreover, we show that the infimum of all these functions Q is the maximal loss function L. The proofs here are quite different from those of our main results. The continuity requirement is:
• continuity. Let g n be a sequence of gambles in G, all with the same finite support S, such that g n → g in distribution 37 (note that g need not be a gamble in G).
(i) If g is a gamble (i.e., g ∈ G) and its support is also 38 S then
(ii) If E [g] = 0 and g is not identically 0 then Q(g n ) → ∞.
An immediate consequence of continuity is:
Lemma 24 Let a, b > 0. For every c > b there exists q such that g a,b;q := (a, q; −b, 1 − q) ∈ G and Q(g a,b;q ) = c.
Proof. The function θ(q) := Q(g a,b;q ) satisfies the following: it is continuous for 0 < q < b/(a + b) (by (i)); θ(q) → 0 when q → b/(a + b) (by (ii)); and θ(q) → b when q → 0 (by (iii)).
Let U 0 be the set of utility functions u : R + → R that are increasing, concave, continuously differentiable (i.e., C 1 ), and satisfy the follow-36 continuity is needed to provide a certain degree of "regularity" for Q; in the results of our Theorems 1 and 3, this regularity is implicitly provided by scaling. In addition, we can no longer prove that Q(g) > L(g) for all g (cf. Proposition 9), and it becomes part of continuity. 37 The support S of all g n is fixed and finite, say of size m, so convergence in distribution is the same as convergence of the vectors of probabilities (as points in the unit simplex of R m ). 38 This means that there is no value in S whose probability vanishes in the limit g.
ing conditions: 39 lim x→0 + u(x) = −∞; the absolute risk aversion coefficient
(which exists a.e) is decreasing; and lim x→∞ ρ u (x) = 0.
Our characterization result is:
Proposition 25 Q satisfies distribution, monotonicity, compound gamble, and continuity if and only if there exists a utility function u ∈ U 0 such that for every g ∈ G
The proof is split into two parts: Lemma 26 and Lemma 27.
Lemma 26 Let u ∈ U 0 , and let Q be given by (15). Then Q is well defined and satisfies the four axioms of Proposition 25.
Proof. First, we claim that for every g ∈ G and u ∈ U 0 equation
has a unique solution w > L(g). Indeed, for every d > 0 we have ρ u (x) > ρ u (x + d) for all x, and so u(x) = ψ(u(x + d)) with ψ strictly increasing and strictly concave; from this it follows that E [u(w + d + g)] ≤ u(w + d) implies E [u(w + g)] < u(w) (using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2 in 40 Hart 2011, with u 1 (x) = u(x) and u 2 (x) = u(x + d)). Therefore there can be at most one w = w 0 satisfying (16), and E [u(w + g)] < u(w) for all w < w 0 , and E [u(w + g)] > u(w) for all w > w 0 . To see that such w 0 exists, note that E [u(w + g)] < u(w) as w decreases to L(g) (the left-hand side goes to −∞), and E [u(w + g)] > u(w) as w goes to ∞ (cf. Proposition 4 (iv) in Hart 2011). In summary, Q(g) = w 0 is well defined, and moreover
39 See Hart (2011) for a discussion of the first two conditions (u(0 + ) = −∞ and dara). Note that u ∈ U 0 need not be twice continuously differentiable (i.e., C 2 ); take, for instance, u(x) = 1 − 1/x for x ≤ 1 and u(x) = log(x) for x ≥ 1 (thus ρ u (x) = 2 for x < 1 and ρ u (x) = 1 for x > 1).
40 It can be verified that the proofs in Hart (2011) apply also when the nonincreasing function ρ u (x) is defined only a.e., since ρ u (x) is the derivative of the concave function
Second, we show that the axioms are satisfied. distribution is immediate. For monotonicity, note that g
, and so Q(g ′ ) < Q(g) by (17). For compound gamble, use the proof of Proposition 6. For continuity: (i) is immediate; for (ii), if Q(g n ) converges to some finite w ≥ L(S) > 0 then E [u(w + g)] = u(w), contradicting the strict concavity of u (recall that ρ(x) > 0 and thus u ′′ (x) > 0 for a.e. x) since E [g] = 0 and g is not identically 0; for (iii), if Q(g n ) converges to some w > L(S) then E [u(w + g)] = u(w), contradicting the strict monotonicity of u since g 0.
Lemma 27 Let Q satisfy the four axioms of Proposition 25. Then there exists u ∈ U 0 such that Q is given by (15).
We first prove a simpler result.
Lemma 28 Let Q satisfy the four axioms of Proposition 25, and let 0 < s < t. Then there exists a strictly increasing function u : [s, t] → R such that E [u(Q(g) + g)] = u(Q(g)) holds for all g ∈ G with Q(g) + g ∈ [s, t]. Moreover, u is unique up to positive affine transformations.
Proof. Put u(s) := 0 and u(t) := 1; for every w in the open interval (s, t) put u(w) := q w , where q w is given by Lemma 24 for a = t − w and b = w − s, i.e., so that Q(g t−w,s−w;qw ) = w. Since Q(g t−w,s−w;q ) is strictly decreasing in q and in w by monotonicity, it follows that q w = u(w) is unique and strictly increasing in w.
To show that E [u(Q(g) + g)] = u(Q(g)), consider first g such that Q(g)+ g ∈ {s, t}; thus g = (t − w, p; s − w, 1 − p) for some p, where w := Q(g). But then p = q w by the uniqueness of q w , and so E [u(Q(g) + g)] = q w u(w + t − w) + (1 − q w )u(w + s − w) = q w = u(w) = u(Q(g)) (recall that u(t) = 1 and u(s) = 0).
Next, take any g such that Q(g) + g ∈ (s, t), say g = (x 1 , p 1 ; ...; x m , p m ), and let w := Q(g). For each i let h i be a two-point gamble h i = (t − w − x i , r i ; s−w −x i , 1−r i ) where r i := u(w +x i ), or, equivalently, Q(h i ) = w +x i ; assume that g and all h i are independent. Then, by compound gamble, f := g + i 1 g=x i h i satisfies Q(f ) = Q(g) = w. But f has only two values, t− w and s−w, and so by the argument in the previous paragraph E [u(w + f )] = u(w). Now E [u(w + g)] = i p i u(w + x i ) = i p i P [h i = t − w − x i ] = i p i P [f = t − w|g = x i ] = P [f = t − w] = E [u(w + f )] = u(w). Finally, if g takes values x i such that Q(g) + x i equals either s or t, then we need no further gamble h i after such an x i .
The uniqueness of u up to positive affine transformations follows by considering again the two-point gambles g t−w,s−w;qw , which yield u(w) = q w u(t) + (1 − q w )u(s).
Proof of Lemma 27. For each integer n ≥ 2, let u n be given by Lemma 28 for s = 1/n and t = n, normalized by u n (1) = 1 and u n (2) = 2. For n ′ > n, the function u n ′ restricted to [1/n, n] must be a positive affine transformation of u n ; since u n and u n ′ coincide at 1 and 2, they coincide on all of [1/n, n]. Thus u n ′ is an extension of u n , and so the function u : R + → R defined by u(w) := u n (w) for any n such that w ∈ [1/n, n] satisfies E [u(Q(g) + g)] = u(Q(g)) for every g (just take n large enough so that Q(g) + g ∈ [1/n, n]). Thus E [u(w + g)] = u(w) when w = Q(g), for all g ∈ G.
Conversely, let w := Q(g) and assume that E [u(w ′ + g)] = u(w ′ ) for some w ′ = w (where w, w ′ > L(g)). Consider first the case w ′ > w. By moving probability mass from the positive values of g to its lowest value −L(g) we get g ′ that satisfies Q(g ′ ) = w ′ and has the same support as g (such a g ′ exists since the intermediate value w < w ′ < ∞ is attained by continuity).
Therefore E [u(w ′ + g ′ )] = E [u(w ′ + g)] (they both equal u(w ′ ) : the first by the previous paragraph for g ′ , and the second by our assumption)-which contradicts the construction of g ′ as u is strictly increasing and thus u(w ′ + x) > u(w ′ − L(g)) for every x > 0. The case w ′ < w is handled in a similar manner, moving probability mass from the negative values of g to its highest value M (g). Thus u is an increasing function, and the equation E [u(w + g)] = u(w) has a unique solution w > L(g) for every g ∈ G.
To show that u is a concave function, let 0 < δ < x; by Lemma 24 there is 1/2 < p < 1 such that Q(g δ,−δ;p ) = x, and so pu(x+δ)+(1−p)u(x−δ) = u(x).
Since p > 1/2 and u is increasing it follows that (1/2)u(x+δ)+(1/2)u(x−δ) < u(x), or u(x + δ) − u(x) < u(x) − u(x − δ), which implies in particular that u is concave on the δ-grid (i.e., when restricted to x = δ, 2δ, ..., nδ, ...). Since this holds for all δ > 0, it follows that u is concave.
Next, we claim that for every ε > 0 and ε < s < t we have
Indeed, let p, p ′ be such that Q(g ε,−ε;p ) = s and Q(g ε,−ε;p ′ ) = t, then s < t implies p > p ′ by monotonicity; from (15) we get 
taking a large enough integer m so that (19) holds for ε = δ/m, and then using (18) with s = x + iε and t = x + iε for i = m, m − 1, ..., 1 yields the following chain of inequalities: 
